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Past Attacks, Future Risks: Where Are We 20-years After 9/11? 
Abstract 
his year, 2021, marks the 20th anniversary since 9/11, recorded as the ‘day that changed 
the world.’ Security remains an area where governments and airlines are continuously 
struggling to stay ahead, but since 9/11 there have been other challenges to the air 
transport industry – not least Covid-19. 
This research primarily critically reviews the actions taken in the aftermath of 9/11 from 
the US and EU perspective, before consideration is given to the current/present situation, 
the new, and emerging challenges being faced. The research is undertaken through a legal/
policy perspective. 
The findings are that internationally and regionally, society is not prepared for another 
attack and that there remain a number of challenges that stand to impact aviation; 
ultimately, more collective action is needed to mitigate for such risks going forward. 
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Written in remembrance all the victims of 9/11  
and other terrorist attacks against aviation 
 
Aviation is a great facilitator, it makes the world seem smaller, physically 
connecting people and society. It drives economies and brings aid and 
relief to disaster and war-torn areas. Air travel facilitates opportunities, 
whether for personal mobility or for trade and business development, 
allowing borders and boundaries to be crossed with relative ease.1 
 
In much the same way, air travel provides the same opportunities for 
criminal pursuits by providing global reach. Criminal activities range from 
smuggling illegal and prohibited items to atrocities committed against the 
transport mode and the supporting infrastructure.2 However, aviation 
remains a target to criminals, too, including terrorists. Aviation has often 
been plagued by direct and indirect events–such as directly being targeted 
for terrorist attacks, and indirectly being affected by global events such as 
wars, oil crises, and pandemics. 
 
It could be said that two of the most significant events in the last twenty 
years have been September 11, 2001 (the past) and Covid-19 (the present). 
Particularly, the latter has reduced, if not stopped, the freedom we have 
taken for granted to fly across the globe. There is no denying that security 
breaches and terrorist attacks have been a significant challenge to the 
industry. Twenty years ago, the events of 9/11 clearly showed the results of 
what can go wrong and the devastation of what could occur. Invariably, 
the impact was far reaching, not just on that day but the enduring legacy it 
left—in term of victims, the destruction, and the changes to the aviation 
sector. 
 
September 11, 2001 is recorded as the “day that changed the world”’ and in 
essence it raised the consciousness of security, not just to the industry, but 
to the public.3 Security remains an area where governments and the 
aviation sector are continuously struggling to stay ahead, but since 9/11 
there have been other challenges to the air transport industry—not least 
Covid-19. This has challenged and changed the world, with a high 
potential to impact on security, including aviation. 
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Aviation as a Target 
 
September 11, 2001 did not mark the first attack in aviation—in its 
relatively short history, aviation has often been plighted by attacks both 
directed at airports and aircrafts.4 It was within thirty years of the Wright 
Brothers taking to the air that aviation was first targeted and exploited by 
criminals and terrorists.5 Since this time, aviation has remained a high-
profile target.  
 
Historically, States’ governments have claimed sovereignty of their skies, 
which influences subsequent policies, ownership rules, and other types of 
legislative actions and restrictions relating to airlines. These policies and 
legislative actions encourage the view that airlines are an extension of the 
State (despite subsequent deregulation and liberalization in many 
countries). These facts and perceptions inevitably leave airlines 
susceptible to attack. In most instances, an attack levied on an airline is 
aimed at what is perceived the State itself—since airlines are often a flag 
carrier of the country.6  
 
In reality, the target is more often the State affiliated with the airline, and 
the political stance being taken or viewed as being adopted by the State 
government. Security breaches and terrorist attacks are therefore 
frequently political statements. This leads to an interesting debate as to 
who is liable for security and who should bear the cost of security 
measures. Security comes at a price; however, the lack of security is 
infinitely more expensive.  
 
Aim & Scope of Present Research 
 
This article is written from a legal and policy perspective (through the 
discipline of law) and takes a triangulated approach (Figure 1: Structure of 
this paper). 
 
• First, historical research is undertaken. The focus is primarily 
on discussing the action and mitigation put into place directly 
after 9/11, and because of the subsequent enquiry.  
• This is undertaken by reviewing, investigating, and reflecting on 
the United States and the European Union approaches in the 
aftermath and as a consequence of 9/11.7  





• The primary approach is to consider this from a legislative and 
policy viewpoint, in terms of consistency and conformity of calls 
for action. 
• Second, the attention is then turned to the present time—
current measures and difficulties (covering factors such as 
sharing passenger details and the conflict between security vs. 
privacy);  
• And, third, as part of this consideration, analysis is given to 
current and future risks, threats, and vulnerabilities, including 
with respect to Covid-19. 
 
Figure 1: Structure of the research presented in this article 
 
 
Responses to Attack 
 
The history of aviation shows the primary approach to security to be one of 
reaction, and not foresight and pro-active prevention. In essence, this has, 
for the most part, resulted in delayed responsive mechanisms, whereby 
policies and practices have been put into place to mitigate the 
reoccurrence of attacks already experienced. 
  
The ICAO Framework for Aviation Security 
 
The Convention on International Civil Aviation was agreed and opened for 
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signatories in 1944 in Chicago (also known as the Chicago Convention).8 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was founded as part 
of the Chicago Convention requirements—with a remit, to support 
diplomacy and cooperation in air transport. At that time security was not 
written into the Convention. 
 
It was not until 30-years later, in 1974, that the provisions for 
international aviation security were first introduced through Annex 17 to 
the Chicago Convention.9 The reasoning was attributed to the growing rise 
of security breaches against aviation in the late 1960s.10 In fact, this 
development by ICAO followed the adoption of several international 
conventions in relation to offences committed against an aircraft.11 ICAO’s 
approach to minimizing security breaches is via a method of assistance, 
whereby ICAO assists Member States through guidance documents such 
as the Security Manual Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of 
Unlawful Interference.12  
 
Today, the initial focus of developing Standards and Recommended 
Practices (SARPs) has evolved to a three-pillar approach. This being 
 
1. Policy initiatives; 
2. Audits focusing on the Member States capabilities to oversee 
their own aviation security initiatives and activities; and, 
3. Assistance to States in addressing serious security 
deficiencies revealed through the ICAO audits (performed 
under the Universal Security Audit Programme—managed by 
the Aviation Security Audit Section–ASA). 
 
The security provisions cover both airports and aircraft. In the years 
between 1973 and 1985, airports were particularly targeted, with twenty-
five attacks occurring at various airports across the globe. Consequently, 
this led to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at 
Airports (signed at Montreal on 24 February 1988), which was 
supplementary to the earlier Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971, Montreal).13  
 
Undoubtedly, these attacks were also instrumental in leading to the 
establishment of the ICAO Aviation Security (AVSEC) Panel in the late 
1980’s (after Lockerbie).14 It is the role of the experts on this Panel to 





advise and address evolving threats to civil aviation. 
 
That said, many of the significant changes to aviation security have come 
as a direct result of tragedies, or near misses that have revealed fallibilities 
in the current security measure. Screening techniques and search methods 
at airports have been particularly investigated in subsequent enquiries. 
And of course, there remains a direct correlation between the security at 
the airport and the risk and exposure to the aircraft. While the focus on 
this article relates to security put in place after 9/11, there are lessons to be 
learned from the 1988 terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over 
Lockerbie in Scotland, which shows the consequences of failures at an 




The report into Lockerbie revealed several failings, plus the inability of the 
international community to undertake concerted action to liaise. This 
included bringing the perpetrators to justice via trial. While this did lead 
to various corrective measures and practices being introduced, it is 
arguable whether all lessons were learned and acted upon before 9/11. 
 
It is questionable whether there has been consistency across the globe in 
terms of implementation of security practices since Lockerbie. The Pam 
Am 103 attack has similarities but also stark difference to 9/11. It did 
involve an U.S. airline—Pan-Am (flight 103)—but the circumstances of 
Lockerbie were also unique in terms of the international depth of this 
atrocity, meaning, the location of the explosion, the fact that many of the 
victims were U.S. citizens (who died in a U.S.-operated aircraft but within 
the territory of the UK, and at the hands of bombers from Libya) who were 
not killed in the event.  
 
While the devastation caused by 9/11 was much higher—in terms of lives 
lost and the sheer destruction—it did not challenge the international 
community in the same way as Lockerbie. Lockerbie, in fact, led to positive 
changes such as preventing luggage being carried without the respective 
owner or passenger onboard.16 One other significant finding of the 
Lockerbie investigation was the accusations levied at the airline itself and 
the fact that the U.S. intelligence services had alerted Pan Am that it was at 
risk; however, it was identified that the airline had repeatedly ignored 
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warnings that its security measures for interlining baggage were not 
sufficient.17  
 
The Presidential Commission investigating the incident placed much of 
the blame for bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 on the “seriously flawed” 
aviation security system, beginning with inept and confused Pan Am 
security at Frankfurt and London. However, criticism was also levied at 
the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and their failure to 
enforce its rules. One of the subsequent recommendations of the 
Commission was that a new assistant secretary of transportation for 
security and intelligence should be created to oversee aviation safety, and 
that the FAA's security division should be elevated to report directly to the 
FAA Administrator (at that time James B. Busey). The Commission Chair 
stated,  
 
 [t]he sad truth [was] that the aviation security system administered 
by the FAA has not provided the level of protection the traveling 
public demands and deserves. The system is seriously flawed and 
must be changed.18  
 
September 11, 2001 
 
Nearly 13-years later and 12-years after the formulation of AVSEC, 9/11 
occurred. The 2001 terrorist attacks once more exposed vulnerabilities in 
air travel. It revealed that previous learning from Lockerbie had not been 
applied. The circumstances had not been foreseen or anticipated by 
experts and other related stakeholders—certainly, factors to mitigate 
attacks had not been effectively utilized. 
 
The 9/11 attacks struck at the heart of the United States and were aimed at 
high-profile physical targets, represented by the Twin Towers in New York 
and the Pentagon—the Department of Defense Headquarters.19 The effects 
were significant. Many lives were lost not only on 9/11, but for a 
considerable period afterwards, which included emergency service 
workers that attended the scenes.  
 
The fallout and consequences extended beyond the United States to global 
economic markets, while also exposing vulnerabilities and heightened 
awareness of the threats posed by terrorism. These attacks were directed 





at a democratic government, whereby they were invariably designed to 
undermine and challenge confidence in States to ensure the protection and 
preservation of society. Not since Pearl Harbor had the United States been 
exposed to such a high intensity of attack on its home soil. The method of 
delivery was perpetrated using airplanes as weapons of mass destruction; 
however, the opportunity arose due to fallibilities in various systems 
related to aviation security. 
 
Debatably, lessons had not been sufficiently learned from Lockerbie. There 
was an obvious indicator of a repetitive trend and propensity not to 
sufficiently or adequately inspect luggage—in this instance, in respect to 
carry-on items. The information given to the subsequent 9/11 Commission 
inquiry highlighted aspects relating to the travel documents (passports) 
and within the visa process for (multiple) entries by the perpetrators into 
the United States. This included non-compliance with immigration law. 
Considered collectively, the 9/11 hijackers:  
 
• Were known al-Qaida operatives who should have been on 
watchlists;  
• Had presented passports “manipulated in a fraudulent manner;”  
• Had presented passports with “suspicious indicators” of 
extremism;  
• Made detectable false statements on their visa applications;  
• Had been pulled out of the travel stream and given greater 
scrutiny by border officials. 
• Made false statements to border officials to gain entry to the 
United States; and  
• Violated immigration laws while inside the United States.  
 
September 11, 2001 caused resounding shock to resonate internationally 
regarding the attack and the vulnerability to aviation. Despite widespread 
condemnation of the attack and “post-9/11 posturing” to be proactive from 
an international and unified perspective, in many instances this 
diminished over a relatively short period of time.20 This is illustrated by 
the fact that one of the most pressing issues in the aftermath of the attack 
related to recovery schemes—in the form of insurance payouts and 
compensation or protection systems.21 The ICAO “Global Scheme on 
Aviation War Risk Insurance” was advocated as a coordinated solution to 
providing assistance in the field of aviation.22 However, as so often been 
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the case with international discussions, attaining final agreement proved 
impossible, for while recognizing the need to achieve stability and 
reassurance during such crisis events, nations could simply not agree on 
the diversification of approaches. In essence, there was not the political 
will nor the mechanism at an international level to successfully implement 
the plan.   
 
The reality remains that international law is comprised of international 
treaties under the principle of international customs, which Member 
States governments decide whether to enter in, or not as the case may be. 
The consequences of this translates to disparity of approaches and variable 
solutions across the globe in terms of aviation security protection. In 
respect to legal approaches across states, in some instances, bilateral 
agreements between countries ensure some consistencies or recognition as 
to accepted practices and procedures operated by the respective nations. 
However, it can also translate to differing levels of security being provided 
and difficulties for passengers in terms of understanding national and 
regional variances and requirements. This means that different physical 
solutions are applied at airports, and there remain different levels of 
effectiveness in terms of information sharing and coordination internally 
(with a country) and between nations. 
 
The 9/11 Commission were informed that the circumstances relating to 
missed opportunities in relation to the visa process, passports, and 
suspicions had offered opportunities to intelligence and law enforcement 
officials, but that the U.S. government did not fully exploit al-Qaida’s 
travel vulnerabilities—which had become detectable prior to 9/11.23 One of 
the reasons cited was neither the State Department’s consular officers nor 
the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) inspectors 
and agents were ever considered full partners in the national 
counterterrorism effort. This is exemplified by the Bureau of Consular 
Affairs’ statement that before 9/11 they were not informed by anyone in 
the State Department or elsewhere that certain nationals, as in this case 
Saudi citizens, could pose security risks. Fifteen of the nineteen hijackers 
were Saudi nationals. Additionally, there were significant security 
weaknesses in the Saudi government’s issuance of Saudi passports in the 
period when the visas to the hijackers were issued.  
 





In other words, there was a failing with respect to sharing information. 
The border inspection services should have had a proactive role in 
counterterrorism as their mission was in hindsight integral to the U.S. 
national security strategy and, given this, they should have been given 
commensurate resources.  
 
Another significant factor identified in the aftermath of 9/11 was the 
disconnect between policymakers and terrorist mobility specialists. It was 
identified that: 
  
 [m]uch remains to be done, within the United States and 
internationally, on travel and identity document security, penalties 
and enforcement policy with respect to document fraud, and travel 
document screening efforts at the borders. If we have one 
conclusion…it is that disrupting terrorist mobility globally is at least 
as important as disrupting terrorist finance as an integral part of 
counterterrorism. 24 
 
September 11, 2001—The impact to the European Union: 
Harmonization? 
 
September 11, 2001 was significant to aviation in terms of security 
amendments and revisions across the globe. It caused nations to revisit 
their own security, including policies, laws, and physical measures. This 
reinforces the fact regarding national variants and the element of security 
in general laying with the competence of a nation and the willingness to 
legislate. 
 
Today, one of the most coordinated and unified approaches to aviation 
security amongst countries globally is recognized to occur within the 
European Union (EU).  However, this only developed as a direct result of 
9/11; prior to then, the European Union had no legislative competence in 
this area, and it was left to each Member State to determine its own 
security measures and apply its own rules and standards to aviation.25 This 
means that there were inherent differences between the States—as is so 
often the case globally. Notwithstanding this achievement, it should also 
be noted that the standard is based on harmonization or commonality 
rather than equal practice being entirely the same regardless of country.  
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The European Union common rules in the field of civil aviation security 
are aimed at protecting persons and goods from unlawful interference and 
minimizing breaches that compromise safety. The development over the 
years has included Regulation (EC) 300/2008, which replaces the initial 
framework Regulation 2320/2002.26 The principle behind this is that the 
E.U. Commission work together with the Member States and other 
stakeholders in determining an efficient E.U. aviation security policy. 
However, there is a division across two policy areas—aviation, falling 
within the Mobility and Transport directorate, and security which lies 
within the now entitled Migration and Home Affairs. This plays a 
significant factor in terms of competence and what level the European 
Union can act. 
 
In respect to aviation, common basic standards relate to: 
 
• The screening of passengers, cabin baggage and hold baggage; 
• Airport security—access control and surveillance; 
• Aircraft security checks and searches; 
• The screening of cargo and mail; 
• The screening of airport supplies; 
• Staff recruitment and training. 
 
This means that some nations stay at a basic level, while others seek to go 
above this. 
 
However, there remains several challenges to security, not just in the 
European Union but worldwide, for example the cost of systems and 
processes, and the acceptance—not least of ensuring the proper balance 
between security measures against privacy rights and protection of 
personal data. From a European Union perspective, this has played a 
significant factor in the implementation of certain measures, and has 
caused disagreement with the United States in terms of data sharing that 
that latter has insisted upon as a consequence of 9/11. 
 
Other factors to consider also relate to travel convenience against 
operational factors—such as time and financial considerations and 
implications. This is significant in terms of cost also and who should bear 
such—for airlines, there is an associated consideration in terms of lost 
revenue for any time when aircraft are on the ground; and for airports, 





there are staffing costs and who financially should pay for physical security 
measures and trained staff. In effect, there are national variants in this 
respect between who employs security agents and who bears financial 
responsibility and where this places them legally in terms liability. 
 
Constantly, across the globe, there is the need to reevaluate technology 
measures and procedures in line with threats, intelligence reports and risk 
assessments at regular intervals or when new challenges become known. 
Though, many of the experiences across the world have resulted in each 
country taking its own response to a shared problem.  
 
While the European approach, among the now 27 Member States of the 
Union, has seen more commonality of practices and procedures than 
occurs elsewhere across the world. 27 This said, as Gladwell observed, any 
responsive physical measures applied lead to the situations whereby, 
“[a]irport-security measures have simply chased out the amateurs and left 
the clever and the audacious.”28 In most cases, these responses stay one 
step ahead of the last attack or attempted attack. 
 
Since 9/11 there have been a number of actual or attempted attacks toward 
aviation globally. In Europe, in 2006, there was an attempted terrorist 
attack out of London-Heathrow airport, whereby the intention was to 
blow-up several aircrafts in flight utilizing homemade explosives.29 This 
led to the EU Commission adopting additional rules for passengers in 
relation to carrying on board liquids, aerosols, and gels (LAG). The ban 
was however only envisaged as a temporary restriction, which would be 
revisited when new technology became available. While this approach is 
replicated across the globe, there are variances with regards to volumes of 
the LAGs permissible. 
 
However, in January 2014, a mandatory requirement was made 
throughout the European Union for all airports to screen with special 
liquid explosive detection equipment (which extended, at that time, to 
purchased LAGs at the airport). Today, many of these provisions exist, 
some seven years after, although there has been a relaxation of purchases 
made at airports. 
 
Then, because of the attempted terrorist attack on December, 25, 2009 
involving explosives concealed on a passenger, a subsequent EU legal 
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framework on security scanners was adopted.30 However, it was stated 
that the use of security scanners at EU airports remained optional for the 
Member State or airport(s) and hence this remains subject to regulation at 
a national level. The Regulation therefore relates to the minimum 
operational standards and conditions for the scanners whereby a 
harmonized approach is adopted (but only when scanners are used). This 
translates to creating common rules and common basic whereby Member 
States can deviate and apply more stringent measures than those laid 
down, or not to apply them at all in some instances. 
 
Therefore, this would seem to run contrary to the principal goal of the 
European Union which relates to a one-stop security approach applied to 
all flights with the Union. In essence, such deviation and diversity stand to 
create not only uncertainty for passengers but inconsistency of standards 
leading to potential vulnerabilities. Currently, it is identified that emphasis 
needs to be given to work across the following key areas: 
 
• The general use of the security scanners at EU airports 
• Working on replacing the ban on liquids, aerosols, and gels by a 
more improved and secure screening procedure 
• Improving the security of the EU bound cargo and mail, which 
departs from airports located outside the European Union 
• Improving the transparency and ensuring cost-related and non-
discrimination when levying charges at the airports. 
 
From a European Union perspective as to who should pay for security, the 
European Union again explains that while this is subject to the relevant 
rules of Community law, it translates through to the fact that the 
protection of civil aviation lies with each “State, the airport, entities, air 
carriers and other responsible agencies, or users.”31 This, therefore, 
identifies a shared approach to security, but one that remains subject to 
coordination and indeed cooperation, not only within a State but across 
States, and not just in respect to aviation but the sharing of other 
information and security data. 
 
The USA: Action(s) After 9/11 
 
The investigation into 9/11 revealed numerous failings relating to 
structuring of agencies and coordination amongst them. As was discussed, 





this related also to the remit of agencies. As of March 1, 2003, INS ceased 
to exist, with its functions being transferred to new entities–US 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), US Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE), and US Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP)— within the newly created Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). 
 
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act established the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the Department of 
Transportation (DoT).32 This Act applied many responses appertaining to 
lessons learnt from the 9/11 attacks (as well as later threats that year) and 
included measures such as fortification of aircraft cockpit doors.33 Prior to 
9/11, the FAA had been working with ICAO to strengthen international 
security standards by adopting a harmonized approach across the world. 
However, the United States responsive measure surpassed this somewhat 
slower mechanism. This again reveals some of the issues of trying to 
ensure a standardized and a consistent approach across the globe.34  
 
However, after the 2015 Germanwings disaster, questions were raised 
regarding the reinforcement standard and the locking of cock-pit door 
procedures more widely.35 This incident revealed a disparity of systems 
and practices across the globe, in terms of security and safety measures 
and protocols, not only from one country to another but also among 
different airlines.  
 
The Germanwings protocol was inline with the rules established by the 
German aviation safety authority, the Luftfarhrt Bundesamt, which states 
that when there are two crew members, one can leave the cockpit—but 
only for the absolute minimum period.36 However, in contrast, the United 
States procedure states that a flight attendant is required to go into the 
cockpit when a pilot leaves it. In terms of US procedures, the US Security 
Act also included the increased use of video cameras within aircraft (and at 
airports) and the authorization for arming flight deck crew with less-than-
lethal weapons.  
 
While surveillance cameras have now become an increasingly used method 
utilized to monitor travelers (and indeed staff) to detect security breaches 
and threats across aviation establishments—permission for the arming of 
crew is not a process that has been adopted widely across the globe. 
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However, these need to be monitored in real-time to ultimately be 
effective, and there are complicating factors to this issue when an aircraft 
is in flight. Coupled with human fallibility–especially tiredness—artificial 
intelligence (AI) can be a limiting factor as it remains only as good as the 
programming and what has been taught or learnt. 
 
Insider threats by aviation staff, has become a major security concern for 
the industry in recent times. This can vary in severity and includes minor 
incidents of negligence, to purposeful criminal offences, through to 
organized crimes, including an opportunity to undertake or assist in a 
terrorist attack, including seizing or hijacking an aircraft, whether at an 
airport or in the air.  The Germanwings disaster, which was allegedly 
purposely perpetrated by a sanctioned pilot, gives obvious concerns as to 
the associated risks involved with permitting certain authorized personnel 
to have weapons onboard. It also shows the fallibility in terms of insider 
threats, as the Germanwings incident clearly showed that security threats 
also manifest themselves from staff and employees.  
 
From a United States perspective, armed personnel have been viewed as a 
key aid to deter or prevent offences on aircraft and is seen as providing an 
added security layer. Historically, air marshals precede 9/11. In fact, they 
have been on US planes for over 50 years, with a sky marshal program 
being established by President Kennedy in the 1961 because of the then 
security breaches and threatened or potential risk of such. The FAA began 
its official Sky Marshal program in 1968, and today the Federal Air 
Marshal Service (FAMS) comes under the supervision of the TSA, which is 
part of the US Homeland Security (DHS).37  
 
Research data from 1999 argued that a hijacker had an 81 percent chance 
of seizing control of an aircraft as compared to the success of bombing an 
aircraft, which was stated at being lower, at 76 percent.38 Given today’s 
security measures, these statistics may well have changed; however, the 
effectiveness of air marshals has not been researched more recently, and 
there remains questions as just how effective and equipped they are to 









The Right to Protection: But Whose Responsibility and by What 
Means? 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) identifies that 
“[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of person,”40 but 
arguably this leads to questions as to whose responsibility is this to 
ensure? When considered from an aviation perspective, enquires after 
incidents have often levied criticism at several organizations—including 
airlines, airports, physical security measures (or the lack of these) and 
agencies—ranging from a whole host, given the international variances 
within countries. Particularly highlighted is the inability to coordinate. The 
preamble of the UDHR reaffirms the intention of Member States to ensure 
the adherence to human rights through their pledge to work in 
cooperation with the UN to achieve this. However, the degree of 
cooperation for aviation security could at times seem to be questionable. 
 
It is a common criticism after an event, and in subsequent investigations, 
that there has been a failure, at some level, in coordinating and sharing 
information—such as intelligence and data of an impending threat. Many 
enquiries have found that a coordinated response may have aided in 
mitigating or even preventing the higher-level of exposure to the risk or 
the event itself. This said, where terrorist attacks have been successful, the 
ultimate culprit is the terrorist(s) or offender(s) and any related network 
behind it. In more recent attacks, the possibility of seeking redress from 
the perpetrator(s) and associated group has proved problematic (suicide 
bombers) and contentious (Lockerbie) and only in rare cases has 
compensation from a source (other than an insurer) been possible.  
 
Lying at the opposite end to security perhaps remains the entitlement to 
privacy with Article 12 declaring that, “[e]veryone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” However, there 
is one key phrase here that is perhaps overlooked and that is in terms of 
whether security is viewed as arbitrary interference or action that is 
needed to keep someone (or others) safe and secure.  
 
Security remains a shared responsibility both at airports and even on 
aircraft, as there remains an inherent linkage between security failures at 
airports which translate to terrorist atrocities in the air or involving 
aircraft. Coupled with this, of course there is the role of the State, or State’s 
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agents, such as security and policing bodies that also factor both in terms 
of culpability and responsibility. 
 
Tools in the Kit: Sharing Information 
 
In the aftermath of 9/11, more emphasis was given to the need for 
government security and law enforcement bodies to collectively work 
together to gain data in a bid to prevent another terrorist attack but amidst 
this there were claims levied (particularly in the United States following 
the creation of Homeland Security). This was viewed as an essential tool in 
the aviation security tool kit. 
 
However, the converse side of this was that this was leading to a mountain 
of digital data being collected on individuals who were never a threat to 
security.41 Privacy activists claimed that the depth and degree of data 
mining was not justified and invaded personal privacy rights, which 
undermined civil liberties and was contrary to constitutional rights and 
other established civil protections. In addition, it was stated that such 
routine collecting meant that potential individuals or groups stood to be 
missed due to the sheer volume. 
 
In today’s digital and cyber age, these issues are increasing becoming 
interlinked and invariably more controversial, as technology presents both 
a challenge to security and equally an opportunity as a means to utilize to 
address threats.42 On the one hand, the Internet is celebrated as a way to 
connect millions of people each day, whereby information is willingly 
shared via this method, yet on the other hand, objections are raised when 
travel records are transferred across borders and biometric data is shared.  
 
This said cooperation and building intelligence and trust is recognized to 
be the most effective way to combat and fight terrorism, which therefore 
ensures freedom of the individual and ultimately preserves their right of 
life.43 The Final Report of the 9/11 Commission, identified the reluctance 
by different security authorities to share information with one another and 
this being one of the main causes of the failure to prevent terrorist attacks. 
The clear need to remove silo mentalities was identified.44 
 
Prior to 9/11, some governments, including the United States, used 
passenger lists to screen travelers before departure against watchlists. As a 





result of 9/11, the United States demanded that other nations adopted a 
more advanced process, as a coordinated approach, and shared passenger 
information. However, at times, this had proved one of the most 
contentious requirements—particularly for the European Union. 
 
Passenger Name Records (PNR): Profiling—The Privacy of Data 
vs. Security Debate 
 
Since 9/11, the focus has shifted to preventing terrorist attacks and 
monitoring those so far unidentified by using more of the detailed 
information collected by airlines and travel agencies when an individual 
books a flight. The revisions to US security led to a requirement for other 
nations to supply the USA with what is called Passenger Name Records.45 
Passenger Name Records (PNR) contains information, such as travel 
itineraries and payment details that can be analyzed to identify high-risk 
travelers before they board their planes.46 But the transmission of such 
sensitive information outside of the originating country has remained a 
controversial issue, which has required numerous barriers having to be 
negotiated.  
 
The United States requirement for airlines to supply PNR data to the 
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) within the DHS ran 
contrary to Article 25 of the 1995 EC (European) Data Protection 
Directive.47 
 
This stated that personal information originating from within 
EU Member States may be transferred to a third country only if that 
country “ensures an adequate level of protection.”  
 
The Commission decided that the United States did not ensure this 
adequate level of protection that would allow the PNR data to be 
transferred from Member States. This presented a predicament for the 
airlines, as they were left in a situation of either breaching European 
Union law (and of the (then) respective national laws implementing such) 
should data be transmitted;
 
fly without supplying the data and receive 
sanctions in the United States, including the potential loss of landing 
rights for the airlines; or, not flying at all to the United States.  
 
While it is appreciated that data and intelligence need to be shared to 
prevent terrorist attacks, there is no denying the concern in sharing 
information of passengers and the storage of the information (including 
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how long the data is stored for). Most of the controversy, however, 
surrounds the use to which PNR data is used, for example automated 
profiling based on passenger data and the use of data mining programs to 
obtain computer-generated risks assessment scores which aim to identify 
passengers who may pose a risk but who are not on any Government 
watch list.48 
 
In relation to the United States-European Union compromise, it in fact 
took many years of negotiations, whereby there was a succession of 
interim agreements and annulments. Part of the initial difficulties related 
to the competence of the European Union to negotiate on behalf of the 
Member States for what was a security matter. Only as late as 2012 was a 
final agreement reached.49 
 
Sending information outside of the European Union has remained a highly 
sensitive issue for the Member States collectively.50 The European Union 
advocated early on that there was a key role to be played by ICAO, who 
later developed a series of guidelines for PNR transfers to governments.51 
That said, the European Union has continually reinforced the challenges 
and hence concerns regarding international PNR transfers, as countries 
continue to establish their own systems and call upon States to supply data 
on passengers.52 
 
In 2016, the European Union eventually adopted a PNR Directive, which is 
additional to an existing Advanced Passenger Information (API) 
Directive53—which is an identification mechanism.54 In the PNR Directive, 
the mandate is to obtain data specifically to fight terrorism and other 
serious crime. This has been described as one of Europe’s most 
controversial directives to date.55 At the same time, it advocated that the 
measures within would “save lives, protect rights, catch criminal and make 
Europe a safer place for citizens.” but that said, it has taken virtually five 
years to achieve, approved by plenary on 14 April 2016.56 
 
There is no doubt that collecting widespread data on passengers, 
commencing earlier than the initial flight, builds up an extensive profile on 
a person, but this has led to concerns of global surveillance programs. It is 
therefore argued that the events of 9/11 merely provided justification for 
the United States to extend it existing mechanisms, such as the earlier 
Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening (CAPPS–I).  






Basics to Extreme Measures  
 
The key invariably remains acceptability of practices and methods by the 
end users alongside the ability to gather and share relevant and valuable 
intelligence that enables crimes to be detected and ideally (alongside this) 
terrorism prevented. There are other tools in the kit box, starting from the 
basic and more generally accepted actions through to the more 
controversial methods, such as PNR and other means of profiling. 
 
Identification of the traveler will always remain a fundamental, but 
somewhat basic and acceptable requirement of air travel. An essential 
element is therefore the related travel document, which is largely 
recognized to be the passport—particularly for international travel. Since 
9/11 biometrics are seen as an essential factor to aid security, which had 
been added to passports. 
 
ICAO have developed the worldwide standard for machine readable 
passports (MRP) as part of the Machine Readable Travel Document 
(MRTD) program. The MRTD has been rapidly growing and developing 
into a traveler identification management system—largely a development 
of the TRIP (Traveler Identification Program) into a wider strategy. 
 
The TRIP Strategy recognizes and adheres to the principle of 
interconnectivity—from registration and issuing of the passport, through 
to the travel document industry (production), regional entities, the 
aviation security authorities, law enforcement bodies, border agencies, 
international organizations and the role of airlines and airports (during 
the travel period). In this way, the emphasis remain on ensuring aviation 
security is viewed as a shared goal with various players taking an active 
role, and is linked to the overarching aim concerning combatting 
terrorism—with a special focus on effective border control management.57 
The premise is, as ICAO’s Secretary General explained, that the  
 
“strategy harmonizes the global line of defense in [the] shared 
battle to confront international terrorist movements, cross border 
crime, and many other threats to civil society and international 
aviation.”58  
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These key messages continue to be reinforced—ICAO clearly recognizing 
the need to work closely with other bodies including, those of the UN (for 
example the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) of the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC), in order to mitigate the threats of terrorism to 
international civil aviation.  
 
Checks and scans at airports–whether of the travel document or person or 
luggage have become an everyday occurrence, but the level of 
advancement and technological use continues to vary across the globe. 
There remains a variance of differing systems and practices being tried 
and implemented. Nevertheless, it is also advocated that despite these 
differences, security checks at airports have become, according to some 
security experts—too predictable whereby the focus is largely being 
directed towards finding items rather than individuals.59 And while 
profiling through the gathering of data (data mining) is controversial—
profiling at airport provides another means of locating a would-be 
terrorist.  
 
However, the acceptability of practices and methods, as used, for example 
in some quarters (Israeli intelligence and border or security authorities) 
would no doubt lead to further contention and issues being raised 
regarding ethical or discriminatory practices if utilized more extensively in 
some countries. Targeting, based upon selected or even random ethnic 
linkage—or preconceived associations—would simply not be acceptable, 
and indeed legal, in many societies. But that said, it is also argued that 
there is value in modified practices based upon demeanor and behavior 
profile analysis at the airport.  
 
Tactical risk assessment of people—in other words behavioral analysis—
allows for the adoption of various methodologies for identifying 
threatening or potentially disruptive individuals through observation or 
questioning techniques. As it is every increasingly recognized that security 
and terrorism prevention is becoming a shared responsibility, the practice 
of Israel’s El Al airline, in training its workers in psychological 
observations techniques, is seen as another essential layer in the safety or 
security process that should be more widely applied and implemented. 
While border force agencies, such as customs and immigration have their 
role to play, there is often criticism that this occurs after the passenger has 
traveled rather than before. Applying a similar technique prior to the flight 





and as part of the checking-in or security process could assist in detecting 
not only terrorists, but those who could become a problem in the air to the 
crew and fellow passengers. Flight Safety Councils have endorsed such an 
approach, which is based largely upon accepted practices undertaken by 
customs and immigrations on arrival.60 
 
The human versus machine debate remains another critical concern in the 
process of detecting potential offenders and terrorists. Alongside the 
human component in interpreting behavior lies the dilemma and anxieties 
of using the next level of automated decisions—particularly, the use of 
artificial intelligence (AI) and the role to be played by AI in aviation 
security going forward. Today, automated decision taking and making are 
becoming increasingly part of the equation and this is set to increase with 
technological developments. There remains concern as to transparency in 
the logic used for such decisions, and essentially the harm that could arise 
should and when an error occur, versus the risk of a terrorist attack in the 
first instance. This apprehension remains an extension of the argument 
relating to the security of data (much of it alleged to be unnecessarily 
obtained in the first place)–namely, the associated risks (of gathering and 
storing it) measured against the merits and successes of its analysis and 
use.  
 
Critics and fundamental rights activists, alongside identifying the intrusive 
and often secretive nature concerning the way the data is gathered and the 
use to which it is put, also identify the opportunity to create a false record 
by or for a criminal or terrorist in a time when cybercrime and cyber 
security is becoming a major challenge.61 Hence, achieving management 
solutions to the storage of data, therefore, is a reoccurring parallel issue. 
Increasingly, there are more worrying factors for aviation security to 
address. As aviation development (alongside other major and critical 
infrastructures) intensifies its reliance on a networked and linked 
information and technology-based framework and support system, it 
opens itself up to newer security and cyber security challenges.62 
Worryingly, this includes cyberterrorism.63  
 
Clear and Present Dangers: Tomorrow Will Become Today 
 
The current security threats to aviation are multifaceted and diverse, 
ranging from the basic to the extreme possibility and scenario. Speaking at 
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a Special Meeting convened by the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the 
UNSC, Dr. Liu stated:  
 
Foreign terrorist fighter movements, landside attacks, threats posed 
by insiders and airport staff, and the use of increasingly 
sophisticated improvised explosive devices are all of significant 
concerns.64 
 
It remains a fact that aviation will continue to remain a high-profile target 
for the extremists. There remain clear and present dangers to aviation, but 
to say that one method presents a higher risk than another would be 
difficult to quantify. That said, going forward there is little doubt that the 
risks from the reliance on ICT systems will become a higher priority, which 
was equally recognized by both ICAO and the UNSC “expanding reliance 
on information technology in all areas of aviation–from navigation to 
communications to security—exposes us to cyber threats.”65 
 
Cyber Security and Cyber Threats 
 
Cyberattack is terminology applied to when there has been illegal 
penetration of systems which could cover a whole range of malicious 
activities—such as hacking (or arguably cracking), jacking and spoofing.66 
Aviation has become increasingly subjected to such cyberattacks. The use 
of cyberspace has become a means by which perpetrators enter computer 
systems without permission and authority, while cyber security involves 
techniques put in place to prevent or mitigate such attacks. 67 These 
defensive mechanisms can range from processes and practices to 
technology developed walls, and other shielding means, whereby the 
intention is to reduce the risk and any threat posed by such illegal 
breaches. 
 
At the 21st Aviation Security Panel Meeting of ICAO a new Recommended 
Practice relating to cyber threats was proposed for adoption by the 
Council. 68 It was subsequently adopted on 17 November 2010.69 The 
emphasis, however, is for each Contracting States to develop their own 
measures to protect information and communications technology systems 
used in civil aviation. As with other aspects of aviation within the 
European Union, regionally there has been a noticeable collective 
approach, not only through the European Union mechanism but also 





through the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) which consists of 
not only E.U. States but other countries which are members to the body.70 
ECAC have been described as an effective ‘think-tank’ for aviation that 
feeds into the European Union (including European Aviation Safety 
Agency (EASA) and EUROCONTROL).71 
 
In 2016, Luc Tytgat the Director of Strategy and Safety Management at 
EASA, reported that aviation systems were subject to an average of 1,000 
attacks each month.72 Today, it is increasingly recognized that the day-to-
day booking systems, and hence, storage of passenger information 
continues to be subject to penetration. While these breaches vary in nature 
and method, there nevertheless remains the potential for more devastating 
consequences where lives are ultimately lost.73 From the airplane 
perspective, EASA has acknowledged, that in the last few years, 
representatives of the pilot community have stated that, pilots’ awareness 
of cyber risks in aviation is increasing but there remains a need to 
constantly revisit cybersecurity learning objectives in the pilots’ academic 
training syllabus.74  
 
Perhaps most worrying is the risk posed to computer-based navigations 
and communications systems—both on-board and at air traffic control 
centers across the globe. These areas of technological development remain 
subject to both insider abuse and unlawful external interference, which 
ultimately could compromise the security and safety of passengers 
traveling within the aircraft, as well as those on the ground. National 
Airspace Systems (NAS)—such as NextGen (in the United States)—
increasingly use advanced technology that is interconnected via network 
systems, which, while improving safety through less isolated and 
separated regional (or national) operations, arguably, intensifies the 
possibility of a cyberattack.75 A 2015 report to Congressional Requesters 
clearly highlighted the fallibilities and weakness in the US air traffic 
control system.76  
 
In Europe, the director of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 
also warned of;  
 
the intensified possibility of a serious cyber-attack through hacking 
into the critical systems of an aircraft from the ground. In fact, the 
director, Mr. Ky, openly revealed to the Association des Journalistes 
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Professionnels de l'Aéronautique et de l'Espace (AJPAE) that his 
organisation had in fact hired someone to test the vulnerability of 
the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System 
(ACARS) used to transmit messages between aircraft and ground 
stations. It took the hacker, who was also a professional pilot, only 
five minutes to penetrate the messaging system and a further few 
days to then gain access to aircraft control systems.77  
 
Warnings had previously been given by Hugo Teso (cyber security 
specialist and pilot) concerning the possibility of hijacking a plane armed 
only with a mobile phone, but despite this as late as 2014 ICAO continued 
to play down the risk, arguing that as the aircraft navigation and other 
control systems were effectively separated from non-critical systems such 
as entertainment that, the risk of hacking critical systems was low.78  
 
In 2013 the U.S. FBI Director expressed the thought that: 
 
I do not think today it [cyber] is necessarily the number one threat, 
but it will be tomorrow. Counterterrorism and stopping terrorist 
attacks, for the FBI, is a present number one priority. But down the 
road, the cyber threat, which cuts across all programs, will be the 
number one threat to the country.79 
 
The issue is that tomorrow keeps happening and cyber threats are today a 
number one threat and arguably one that we are not prepared for. 
 
A 2016 report investigated the risks as perceived by the transportation 
sector and identified that the interconnectivity of a global society 
presented a number of challenges to all modes.80 The segmentation 
relating to “digital vulnerability and rapid technological advancements” 
was clearly viewed as one of the greatest challenges and concerns to the 
sector.81 The air industry in particular identified that failure of the critical 
IT systems was of high concern to aircraft lessors, with airlines identifying 
their apprehensions due to the risks posed by the rapid pace of 
technological advancements and an inability to keep pace with it.  
 
In 2020, concerns were repeated to Congress, much in the same way as 
they had been in the 2015 report, when it was identified that the “FAA 
should fully implement key practices to strengthen its oversight of avionics 





risks.”82 Ultimately, these vulnerabilities continue to remain a concern for 
the present, which will only intensify and inevitably become increasingly 
significant and prevalent tomorrow. 
 
A further categorization of risk however also related to the aspect of 
“geopolitical instability and regulatory uncertainty,” with terrorism being 
identified as a clear issue of concern within this grouping. Risks once 
considered "emerging" are now clearly viewable as being at the corporate 
doorstep and hence cyber-terrorism is also beginning to knock loudly. 
These two top areas of concern, as identified in the Transportation Risk 
Index report (2016), certainly have the potential to become more linked, 





The definition for cyber-terrorism remains contested and controversial in 
terms of what is categorized as a cyberterrorist attack, as distinguished 
from a cyberattack; however, the clear distinction applied here is that a 
cyber-terrorist intends (through cyberterrorism) to undertaken a 
purposeful act which has the intention, or is foreseen as the consequence, 
to cause mass disruption and normally the death of and loss of lives—by a 
means perpetrated through some type of internet or computer interaction. 
Therefore, cyberterrorism can be simplified as the convergence of 
cyberspace and terrorism (that is, the same two top fears expressed by the 
CEOs within the transport sector).83 Put another way, it is the convergence 
of the real physical world with the virtual environment whereby an action 
in a virtual (computer) world translates through to real and actual 
consequences to society. Like terrorism, therefore, the intention is to 
create terror and a feeling of fear in society.84 
 
As early as 1990, the National Academy of Sciences began a report on 
computer security with the words, “[w]e are at risk. Increasingly, America 
depends on computers…Tomorrow’s terrorist may be able to do more 
damage with a keyboard than with a bomb.”85 This message has continued 
to be reiterated by a string of US Presidents and their respective advisers 
(as well as other leaders around the globe): 
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• In 1999 President Clinton identified, “we must be ready...ready 
if our adversaries try to use computers to disable power grids, 
banking, communications and transportation networks”86  
• George W. Bush, (as a presidential candidate) warned before 
9/11, that “American forces are overused and underfunded 
precisely when they are confronted by a host of new threats and 
challenges—the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the rise 
of cyberterrorism, the proliferation of missile technology.”87  
• In 2002, Tom Ridge, director of the Department of Homeland 
Security, identified, “Terrorists can sit at one computer 
connected to one network and can create worldwide 
havoc....[They] don’t… need a bomb or explosives to cripple a 
sector of the economy or shut down a power grid.”88 
• President Obama stressed, during his State of the Union address 
in 2013, that, “We know hackers steal people’s identities and 
infiltrate private e-mail…now our enemies are also seeking the 
ability to sabotage…our air traffic control systems.”89  
 
There is little doubting that the risk of cyber-terrorism is both known and 
growing, and, with both technological advancements and continuous 
world instability the risks therefore are set to intensify rather than 
diminish. The potential is that this period of self-isolation due to Covid-19, 
has provided the opportunity for attacks to be planed and for skills to be 
matured in terms of utilization within the cyber domain. 
 
Cyber-terrorism has several obvious key advantages over traditional 
terrorist methods for would be perpetrators: 
 
• First, it is, in general, a cheaper method compared with most 
attacks already experienced against aviation. All that is required 
is a computer with Internet access. 
• Second, it provides the ability to target numerous sites and 
facilities (including from a simultaneous perspective). 
• Third, it has the potential, because of a successful attack, to 
impact upon a larger number of people than more traditional 
methods—for examples, attacks against the electric, water or 
transport infrastructures (particularly with simultaneous or 
sequential attacks).  
• Fourth, it remains a more anonymous and untraceable 





method—whereby nicknames can be used and methods 
implemented to distort or hide the originator location. 
• And finally, it can be conducted remotely. In essence, it provides 
the opportunity to evade capture, to stay alive and remain 
anonymous or untraceable.  
 
In truth, cyberterrorism currently reduces the risk for the perpetrators and 
arguably increases it for ‘possible’ targets—for example, to aviation and 
other infrastructures that rely on the Internet. Coupled with this there is of 
course the further risk of an insider providing access and information 
which would facilitate and assist with needed codes and access. 
 
The question remains as to how prepared the international community is 
at reacting to cyber security breaches, let alone cyberterrorist attacks. At 
the 2015 Conference on Civil Aviation Cyber Security the Secretary 
General of ICAO, Raymond Benjamin, stated, that there had been, “no 
catastrophic cyber security event has been reported to ICAO to this point 
in time.”90 Again, prevention would be preferable to response action and 
yet traditional acts of terrorism have notoriously been difficult to prevent.  
 
In many ways protection against cyberterrorism requires more 
coordination and cooperation than any other form of terrorism prevention 
and therefore presents a major challenge to the industry. The recent ECA 
position paper acknowledged that  
 
“[d]ue to the interdependencies in the realm of aviation, cyber 
security is a shared responsibility of authorities, aircraft 
manufacturers, airlines, airports and air traffic control 
organizations together with their suppliers.”91  
 
However, due to the nature of cyberspace, the response requires not only 
the collective measures across aviation, with all of the respective players 
actively participating, but it also requires action and responses from 
parallel industries—such as the telecommunications sector and inevitably 
law enforcement bodies. That said, the aspect of Internet governance is 
perhaps even more contentious than the sovereignty (ownership) and 
governance factors relating to aviation.92 “[W]hile the sky above us has no 
discernable-physical boundaries” the same is perhaps more true in terms 
of the cyberspace which largely remains outside the scope of most 
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instruments, certainly from an international perspective, and hence 
coordinating policies and approaches across borders continues to prove 
problematic.93 Related to this of course remains the collective willingness 
to cooperate; and, while the threats of cyberattack to the aviation industry 
are well known, in truth, there has also been a degree of apathy and 
lethargy in agreeing joined action and initiatives in the past. For example, 
although the Beijing Treaties were said to respond to “new and emergent 
threats to [aviation] security,” with the Convention being identified by 
Abeyrante as “a step forward in the right direction with the threat of cyber 
terrorism looming;” both the Convention and the Protocol remain 
increasingly unlikely to enter into force due to a lack of signatories, and 
hence international support.94  
 
Arguably, the premise from ICAO, while being directed towards 
emphasizing the need to strengthen national frameworks clearly also 
reinforces the need for international cooperation among Member States.95 
And, in the 2017 report on aviation safety, ICAO referred to the fact that at 
the 39th Session of the ICAO Assembly in October 2016, the ICAO 
Council had adopted several resolutions related to security breaches, 
namely, acts of unlawful interference, including: 
  
• Promulgating ICAO policies related to the safeguarding of 
international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference, 
and 
• Urging States to support the Convention on the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (Beijing 
Convention of 2010) and the Protocol Supplementary to the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 
(Beijing Protocol of 2010.)96   
 
While the concept of cyber risk is known to the industry, the concern 
however remains, as ICAO stated, that unlike certain economic sectors such 
as banking, wherein cyber-threats and vulnerabilities are well known and 
comprehended, and hence countermeasures have been implemented to 
mitigate identified risks; in the aviation domain, “cyber related risks are not 
always well understood by all States and stakeholders, nor are they 
addressed in a consistent and systematic manner.”97 The potential reality is 
questionably as Luc Tytgat said, “[w]e have to be prepared always for the 
worst,” “We have to take it seriously……” “We do not have much time.”98 






There is no doubting that the cyber risk to aviation will intensify along 
with the number of devices connected to the Internet Protocol (IP) 
networks, which is anticipated to be almost twice the global population by 
the end of this decade.99 Alongside this, the number of passengers taking 
flights is also set to increase leading to more aircraft occupying the skies 
and hence ever greater reliance on interconnected computer systems for 
various operations—related to safety and efficiency. Invariably, these 
systems will remain vulnerable to cyber penetration (including 
cyberterrorism) and the obvious starting point to mitigate these risks must 
be fully understanding the issue in the first instance; and, secondly, 
adopting a united stance (across sectors—including within aviation) to 
tackle this nemesis.  
 
Other Threats: Drones, Missiles 
 
Drones or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) present another emerging 
threat to aviation.100 This risk comes from their general usage in shared 
airspace plus the fact that they are arguably more prone to cyberattack 
than civil aircraft. It is estimated that drone use will intensify into the 
2020’s and beyond—with the drone sector becoming a significant 
component of the global aviation industry.101 Predictions are that this will 
present a “new ‘risky’ era for aviation,” for, although there are immense 
opportunities, there are also challenges that need to be factored in, too.102  
One recent report questioned whether drones could even prove to be the 
greatest global security threat of the future.103 
 
Like the Internet and cyberspace, currently there is an acute lack of 
governance relating to the use of drones, certainly there remains 
divergence and differences across countries, many of which have their own 
operating rules and guidance. The training of operators (whether in a 
commercial or hobby or recreational environment) and the registration of 
craft104 are therefore key considerations and obvious starting points, in 
terms of increasing safety as well as minimizing security breaches.105  
 
One heightened risk to aircraft is when they are in the vicinity of landing 
areas (near to airports and airfields) and it therefore remains crucial for 
drone operators to know where controlled and restricted airspace is and to 
respect the guidance and legislation that exists. That said, in the UK, for 
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example, drones weighing 7 kg or less are not required to have the 
permission of Air Traffic Control (even when flying within Controlled 
Airspace or within an Aerodrome Traffic Zone—ATZ).106 However, it is 
also recognized, that in practical terms, drones of any weight could present 
a particular hazard when operating near an aerodrome or other landing 
site due to the presence of manned aircraft. This therefore intensifies 
existing risks to aircraft when landing and taking off.  
 
In the UK, in April 2017, it was reported that a commercial passenger 
plane approaching Heathrow Airport (in November 2016) had been 
involved in a near-miss incident involving several drones and on April 22, 
2017 an Airbus A319, when coming into land at Liverpool John Lennon 
Airport, was involved in what is believed to be the closest near miss to be 
recorded, when a drone passed by the aircraft’s wingtip.107 Even at 
significant heights planes remain at risk—in 2020 a drone is said to have 
nearly hit Manchester easyJet plane window at 8,000ft.108 The 
interference or threat of interference to civilian aircraft, by drones, could 
also be used as a means of extortion, e.g. pay a ransom otherwise 
disruptions or worse will occur.  
 
Hence, this risk increases further when a drone is operated with malicious 
intent where the intention is to purposely commit a criminal act including 
interfering with aircraft. Drones can carry incendiary devices, grenades, 
and other items (such as radio-active or hazardous material) into the 
airspace. A swarm of drones would prove to be a formidable army to stop.  
 
There is also the potential for control to be seized through a cyber security 
breach, whereby criminals or terrorists block the navigation or 
communication systems of someone else’s UAV—thus taking control of it. 
It remains a fact that the unencrypted data links for command and control 
and navigation, used by most civilian drones, make them particularly 
vulnerable to jamming, interception and manipulation.109 Research has 
already highlighted the ease with which drones can be attacked in this 
manner, and hence cyber security, particularly for commercial drone 
operations, remains a pressing factor for discussion—requiring 
international coordination, much in the same way as is constantly being 
stated is necessary for commercial air movements.110 There can be little 
doubting that these two issues, cyber security risk to drones and cyber 
security risk to commercial air transport, are, and will continue to become, 





inextricably linked. Cyber threats to manned systems are today’s 
challenge, which will only increase alongside the threats posed by and to 
drones.111 
 
As well as emerging threats, other challenges remain. At times, there has 
been the potential for conflict in jurisdiction to arise in terms of civil and 
military use of aircraft. For while States can legitimately protect their 
territories against unlawful incursions and other perceived acts of hostility 
from the air, using military and even police intervention (which remains 
outside the scope of the Chicago Convention) there have been occasions 
where civil aircraft have purposely been targeted by both States and other 
third parties in acts of hostility.112  
 
September 11, 2001 is said to have led to discussions concerning the 
possible need to scramble military jets to protect the airspace above 
Washington following the seizure of aircraft by terrorists.113 However, 
although it is known that there was protocol in existence between the FAA 
and NORAD the 9/11 Commission Report concluded that it was “unsuited 
in every respect” to the events of that day.114 
 
Under Article 3 d) of the Convention contracting States have accepted a 
legal commitment “when issuing regulations for their State aircraft, that 
they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.” 
However, while States remain able to intercept suspect aircraft in the air, 
they must act in conformity with the requirements stated in Annex 2 of the 
Convention.115  It was the shooting down of the Korean Airlines (B-747) 
flight KAL-007 in 1983 that led to the adoption of this provision by the 
25th Session (Extraordinary) of the ICAO Assembly on 10 May 1984, in 
which it was reinforced that “every State must refrain from resorting to the 
use if weapons against civil aircraft in flight.” Therefore it has been 
debated and questioned as to whether a State could actually use deadly 
force against a civil aircraft if there were serious reasons to fear the 
consequences of non-intervention (as occurred during 9/11)—however, it 
would have to be deduced that such events were not imagined when ICAO 
discussed the 1983 shooting; and, in any event, the wording implies that 
there is an action of last resort which could prevail. This tends to be 
inconformity with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which concerns self-
preservation of the State. 
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In addition to the launching of state aircraft there is also the risk of n 
Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) and other surface-to-air 
missiles systems (particularly of a moveable nature) to commercial 
aircraft.116 Self-guiding weapons can target civil aircraft, especially with 
the aid of infrared sensors or more sophisticated laser devices. ICAO first 
addressed this matter in Assembly Resolution A32-23: MANPADS Export 
Control, and in 2003, in Resolution A35-11: Threats to civil aircraft posed 
by man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). The message was later 
repeated in September 2007 at the 36th session of the ICAO Assembly, 
which called upon action by States in Resolution A36-19, and later in 2010 
in Resolution A37-17. However, on July, 17, 2014, the risk to civil aircraft 
by such devices was bought home when a Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 
(Flight MH17) was shot down over Donetsk in eastern Ukraine.117 At the 
time, the Ukrainian government and the Russian-backed rebel militia were 
engaged in a civil war. While the circumstances surrounding the bringing 
down of the aircraft remain disputed in some quarters, the consensus 
remains (as stated in the official Dutch investigation report) that the 
aircraft came down as the result of the detonation of a 9N314M-type 
warhead launched from a Buk missile system.118 At the time of the attack 
the plane was flying at 33,000ft (10,000m). 
 
As a result of the events ICAO undertook investigations that followed-up 
the recommendations of the Netherlands Safety board relating to 
improving the management of risks associated with flying over conflict 
zones.119 Perhaps, in hindsight, many of the Recommendations within the 
Netherlands report should have already have been implemented, or even 
considered by ICAO, with State responsibility also being emphasized when 
there is armed conflict in their territory (including early circulation of 
airspace restrictions).120 However, it should be noted that ICAO Annex 17 
Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful 
Interference, at paragraph 2.4.3., already contains a requirement for each 
State to “establish and implement procedures to share with other 
Contracting States threat information that applies to the aviation security 
interests of those States, to the extent practicable.”121 ICAO has also 
emphasized that this is not just limited to information concerning threats 
within a State’s national borders but where threats in foreign jurisdiction 
could impede the safe movement of civil aircraft. Once again this 
reinforces that sharing of information and related data is viewed as being a 





key defense mechanism at preventing attacks, where security and safety 
stand to be compromised.  
 
Going forward, any future recommendations and implementation of 
practices and procedures that aim to improve the safety of civil aviation 
are to be welcomed, but it also must be noted that there has been a steady 
rise of man-portable air defenses systems across the globe, which extends 
outside the competence of State actors and increasingly include operation 
by terrorists and other guerrilla factions. Additionally, the understood risk 
of such systems was largely associated with the capacity to fire at low-
flying aircraft, but the shooting down of MH17 has shown the increased 
vulnerability of aircraft outside a previously perceived range. This 
therefore will continue to remain a security and safety concern to civil 
aircraft, particularly given the instability across the globe and the lack of 
defenses available to aircraft used in civilian passenger and freight 
movements.122 The technical capability of such devices is also likely to 
increase with time, which makes this a potential increased area of risk to 
aircraft in the future. 
 
Continued concerns for air safety also arise from the increase of laser 
attacks, particularly during the critical phases of flight, like taking off and 
approaching to land. And, while most attacks have occurred at lower 
altitudes of a few thousand feet, the FAA has received reports from flight 
crews of attacks at 10,000 ft. and higher.123 Attacks have also been 
recorded by air traffic control staff; and, recognizing this to be a growing 
problem, various working groups have been established to review 
legislation and the seriousness of such interference to aircraft and the 
respective personnel affected.124 This is currently viewed as an “evolving 
menace”125 and hence stands to be both a safety and security concern to 
aviation. 
 
20/20 vision: 2021 Challenges 
 
Twenty years on as we remember the events of September 11, 2021, there 
should be some reassurance that security protocols and systems have 
improved in this time to mitigate the failing of that day. This said aviation, 
is now challenged by newer and more advanced (technology) risks, that 
arguably we are not fully prepared to deal with. The Year of Security 
Culture coincides with the risk presented from Covid-19 to date (2020-
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2021). This virus has also dramatically affected aviation in terms of 
movement, but as stated at the start it might also have allowed terrorism 
and other security attacks to be planned, including against aviation. As we 
continue to return to more international flights, aviation looks noticeably 
different, especially in terms of safety protocols to prevent further 
escalation of the pandemic. In doing, so we also run the risk of taking the 
eye of the ball from a security perspective. 
 
The European Union has clearly recognized the impact of Covid-19, which 
has also included limiting the number of on-site visits for the designation 
and re-designations of air carriers and cargo operators in third countries. 
The virus has severely impeded this and has led to change of practices. It is 
also recognized that the ability of airports in the European Union to 
complete the process of installing standard three explosive detection 
systems (EDS) equipment (technology for the screening of hold baggage) 
has also been severely impacted by Covid-19 pandemic.126 This has led to a 
new road map—one based upon further flexibility being applied. 
Consequently, there is likely to be more variations of approaches across 
the European Union and specifically in relation to screening methods 
used. 
 
Coupled with this, the 2012 PNR Agreement between the United States 
and European Union has now been declared invalid in terms of the 
adequacy of the protection of data provided by the European Union-
United States Privacy Shield Framework. As of July, 2021 the linchpin 
aviation security agreement between the European Union and United 
States has not been agreed and sees a return to the earlier position in 
terms of the ability to share information, which by itself compromises 
security or runs the risk of illegal transactions to the United States. The 
irony however is that in terms of safety due to the pandemic, medical 
records are however now being shared across nations. The implications of 




There is no doubt that terrorist attacks, such 9/11, come at a high price and 
that there are a multitude of victims, in terms of not only the physical 
casualties (and the effects to relatives/friends of those who lose their lives 
or are injured and maimed) but to infrastructure, airlines, airport and 





other stakeholders–including respective governments and the insurance 
community. 
 
However, while there has been widespread condemnation of terrorism and 
terrorist attacks, the conviction of the international community has not 
been consistent and long-lasting. This inevitably links to the findings 
relating to many of the terrorist attacks against the aviation sector, namely 
that there have been failings in relation to communicating and sharing 
intelligence of impending attacks and that there has been, and arguably 
remains, an inherent failure in cooperating and collaborating not only 
across country borders but within countries.  
 
Today, there remain continuous challenges to aviation (both to aircraft 
and to the supporting infrastructure). Old challenges remain but new ones 
are also developing and intensifying the risk. And, while 9/11 highlighted 
the vulnerability to this transportation mode, the prevailing years have 
since shown the increased risks and vulnerability to other modes and to 
general society through international terrorist attacks. This escalation of 
terrorism directed at other modes could be concluded to be because of the 
systems, practices and protocols put in place to directly reduce the risks to 
aviation (for example at the airports, with increased screening of 
passengers and advanced sharing of passenger data and information). 
However, it has also been shown that there is a lack of consistency in 
terms of aviation too—which leave some airlines and airports being more 
vulnerable than others. 
 
There is no denying the investment into aviation security, which, at 
airports, is said to be “the closest to comprehensively addressing 
terrorism.”127 However, close does not equate to being the maximum 
provisions to eradicate prevailing risks. Infiltration of aviation systems 
remains a clear and present risk, both from a safety and security 
perspective—while the intention may vary, the consequences can be 
catastrophic. The developing challenges relating to the Internet, IT 
systems and cyberspace undoubtedly produce the biggest test that still 
needs to be overcome. And it would be realistic to conclude that for the 
aviation industry this remains an area that all players (governments, 
airlines, and other actors) are continuously struggling with; arguably, 
firstly there must be a need to recognize the full extent of the challenges, 
and then secondly, to then stay ahead of these challenges. But again, this is 
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not isolated to aviation alone and therefore this complicates the actions to 
prevent and mitigate such risks. These challenges face many industries 
and critical infrastructures and crossover into adjoining areas—not least 
the area of telecommunications and computer networks. These are not 
national issues but global problems, which require an international 
response. One then will be better synchronized than it has been in the 
past. 
 
Throughout this article reference has continually been made for the need 
to share information and coordinate data and responses. While on 
occasions this approach has been seen to challenge human rights through 
the sharing of data on individuals, repeatedly it is confirmed that without 
this close liaison, responses will not be sufficient at a national or regional 
level to deal with threats and abuse, which now has taken on a clear 
transnational dimension.  
 
There is a role to be played by everyone to prevent security breaches and 
terrorist attacks, the latter of which are progressively aimed, not only at 
governments but ordinary citizens of states. This is the clear message by 
ICAO—security is everyone’s responsibility. In 2021, the direction of travel 
is aimed at changing the security culture. 
 
Terrorists wish to strike fear into communities, increasingly terrorizing 
civilians, ultimately with the aim of coercing governments and the 
international political community into giving into their demands and 
hence, recognizing their cause. The Internet has long been seen to be a tool 
for recruitment and a means to promote propaganda, now it is 
increasingly being seen as a weapon by which “[t]errorists can sit at one 
computer connected to one network and can create worldwide havoc.”128 
Aviation is set to remain a key target—because of it is high profile appeal 
and clear connections to states’ governments, in terms of both ownership 
and control, and the aspect of sovereignty of their skies.129 This makes 
detection particularly challenging. 
 
Not recognizing the risk to aviation of terrorism and other security 
violations and offences was ultimately short-sighted of the international 
community at the 1944 Chicago Conference. Arguably, since this time, 
aviation has been perpetually in a state of trying to play catch-up for one 
security breach after another. And while it has ultimately been successful 





in many respects, the challenges of cyberspace are set to present the 
greatest challenge of them all, and certainly will be a more prevalent risk 
as we enter the second decade of this century.  
 
Automation and new transport systems, such as drones, add another 
complexity to the skies, and therefore are risks to the airline industry; 
viewed arguably, from both a negative and positive stance (as a challenge 
and opportunity). The skill going forward will be in reducing the risk 
vulnerabilities while developing and maximizing the opportunities of their 
use in a positive way. Insider threats transcend many of the areas of risk 
and vulnerability to airlines—including at airports, within the aircraft and 
through Internet and linked or connected systems (such as air traffic 
control centers). 
 
Vigilance is paramount to minimizing risks and stopping terrorist attacks, 
this includes amongst staff and passengers and extends into the area of 
information and data sharing (within organizations, across organization 
and around the globe). Technology advancements are set to continue, 
while these are aimed at improving safety and increasing efficiency, 
ultimately there are associated risks, not least of security penetrations.  
 
It remains disputed as to whether the world has in fact become more 
unstable, but what is known is that the potential for, and ability to cause, 
destruction and havoc on a mass scale has increased alongside the 
accessibility and ease of acquiring such weapons to do so. And, arguably, 
we are still not sufficiently prepared for these challenges. September 11, 
2001 showed that aircraft themselves could be easily turned into a weapon 
and used to target states and citizens. Taking over an aircraft by remote 
means may well be the next development and disaster to be faced by 
aviation.  
 
In 2021, society is still being challenged by a global pandemic which, has, 
without doubt, unbalanced the world but it may have ironically also 
presented an opportunity for zealots and would-be terrorists to plan 
events to further destabilize society. Invariably, there will be lasting 
implications and consequences to society, aviation is once again being 
challenged, financially and potentially in terms of security risks.130 Even 
basic methods, that are readily available, such as laser devices, stand to 
affect the safety of passengers as well as those on the ground.  
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The sad truth is that there will always be threats to aviation (along with 
other vulnerable sectors).131 In all reality, achieving zero risk will 
invariably never be possible—safety and security will always stand to be 
comprised, whether by purposeful or unintentional actions or events.  This 
said, the aim must always remain to achieve zero safety or security 
incidents, or—in failing to achieve this—attain the closest possible result to 
zero through mitigation methods that address, not only for today’s 
knowns, but tomorrow’s perceived challenges and threats. 
In this changed world, it will not be enough to address aviation security in 
isolation.132 Concerted effort needs to be given across sectors, each player 
accepting a degree of responsibility and duty to act. The protection of 
aviation also rests on targeting the root cause of terrorism and the ‘will 
and want’ to take lives. This undeviatingly remains the greatest challenge 
to society and one wherein we all have a shared responsibility to stop this 
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